The Umbrella Problem: How Conglomerate Logistics Choke Out the Independent Trucking Industry

Introduction

Since deregulation, the trucking industry has been sold the idea of “free markets, open access, and fair competition.”What’s happened instead is not freedom — it’s capture. Brokerages, carriers, logistics platforms, and even tech and insurance arms have consolidated under umbrella corporations that squeeze independent operators out of any real bargaining power.Meanwhile the same playbook was perfected decades ago in agriculture — where a handful of conglomerates control grain, livestock, and freight all in one.We are at the moment of truth. Either the law intervenes, or independents vanish.

Consolidation in Trucking: The Silent Coup

In public filings and 10-K exhibits, the evidence is stark: the market is no longer a vast expanse of competing carriers and brokers; it’s a hierarchy of integrated platforms.Brokers buy carriers. Carriers invest in broker tech. Insurance arms underwrite the same load boards.These connections kill transparency, flatten rates, and eliminate alternatives.Among the major logistics players, we see billions in revenue, intermediated freight, and captive subsidiary fleets — all pointing toward a vertical control structure.

The Agricultural Parallel: What They Did to Farms, They’re Doing to Trucking

Corporate dominance was perfected first in agriculture — now it’s migrating to the highways.The livestock and grain monopolies of the last forty years provide the blueprint for what’s unfolding in freight logistics.

Livestock / Meatpacking.Four dominant firms — JBS, Tyson, Cargill, and National Beef — control nearly 80 to 85 percent of U.S. beef processing (Greene, 2019; U.S. DOJ, 2007; Hendrickson & Howard, 2018).Through mergers since the 1980s, their market share rose from roughly 36 to 85 percent, enabling price control and margin extraction from ranchers.These firms now extend into feed supply, logistics, and even lobbying (Farm Action, 2025; Musharbash, 2024).

Grain / Commodities.The “ABCDs” — Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus — dominate global grain trade, port facilities, storage, shipping, and financial hedging (Farm Action, 2025; PYMTS, 2024).Together they handle roughly 70 percent of global grain movement.Combine that with trucking umbrella companies, and the supply chain’s consolidation becomes total — from farm to warehouse to consumer.If this were agriculture, it would be called price-fixing. In trucking, it’s marketed as optimization.

The Legal Framework & Antitrust Hooks

This situation falls squarely within the intent of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.The law prohibits mergers and business practices that substantially lessen competition.It forbids monopolization, price coordination, and discriminatory practices that harm market participants.

Applicable provisions:

• Sherman Act §1 / §2 — Collusion and monopolization

• Clayton Act §7 — Mergers that substantially lessen competition

• Robinson-Patman Act — Discriminatory pricing

• State Unfair Trade Acts — Deceptive and restrictive practices

• Essential Facilities Doctrine — For chokepoint platforms

Economic Impact on Independent Carriers

Rate compression, restricted access, and opaque costs define the life of the small carrier today.When umbrella corporations own the broker, the shipper, and the insurance arm, the independent driver negotiates against the same conglomerate three times over.Accessorials, detention pay, and deadhead miles are buried in contracts written by the very parties profiting from the confusion.

The Math of Control: 2024 Revenue per Mile

Public 10-K filings and MCS-150 mileage data expose the financial weight behind consolidation.

Carrier	2024 Revenue (USD)	MCS-150 Miles (VMT)	Revenue per Mile (USD)
Landstar Ranger Inc.	$ 4.819 B	386,633,977	$ 12.47 / mi
Knight-Swift (Consolidated)	$ 7.41 B	1,459,987,558	$ 5.08 / mi
Schneider National Inc.	$ 5.29 B	929,251,021	$ 5.69 / mi
J.B. Hunt Transport Services	$ 12.09 B	1,629,835,251	$ 7.42 / mi
Werner Enterprises Inc.	$ 3.03 B	796,071,597	$ 3.81 / mi
XPO Inc. (LTL)	$ 7.70 B	686,917,915	$ 11.21 / mi
RXO Inc. (Broker)	$ 4.30 B	18,165,582	$ 236.85 / mi
Ryder Integrated (Logistics only)	$ 12.39 B	312,510,886	$ 39.63 / mi

The weighted average across these major entities is about $ 9.40 per mile, but the distribution shows vertical separation: a few asset-light intermediaries earning fifty times more per mile than fleets actually moving freight.This imbalance underpins the demand for transparency under 49 CFR § 371.3(c) — not as politics but as economics.

Broker vs Carrier Yield Comparison

Entity Type	Company (Example)	Revenue (2024)	Operating Margin	Approx. $/mi Yield
Broker / 3PL (Algorithmic)	C.H. Robinson Worldwide Inc.	$ 17.7 B	15.6 %	≈ $ 16 / mi (effective)
Hybrid Carrier + Broker	Hub Group Inc.	$ 3.95 B	8 %	≈ $ 7.2 / mi
Transnational Holding Carrier	TFI International Inc.	$ 8.8 B	9 %	≈ $ 8 / mi
Asset-Based Carrier	Knight-Swift / Werner	$ 7.4 B / $ 3.0 B	4 % – 5 %	$ 3 – $ 5 / mi
Independent Owner-Operator	Typical Small Fleet	N/A	< 2 %	$ 1.60 – $ 2.00 / mi

Source: FOPT Apples-to-Apples Carrier Revenue and Mileage Analysis (2025); public 10-K and 40-F filings.

The Money Behind the Umbrella: Broker Power and Wall Street Ownership

C.H. Robinson’s 2024 Form 10-K details $ 17.7 billion in revenue, 450 k contracted carriers, and 83 k shippers worldwide.Its Navisphere platform manages 37 million shipments—a digital regulator for freight prices.BlackRock Inc.’s 2024 Form 10-K shows $ 10 trillion in assets, holding 5–9 percent stakes in nearly every major logistics firm.Together they form the top and bottom of the umbrella: algorithmic brokers and financial owners feeding off the same lane rates.

BlackRock’s stewardship program engages with over 3,000 companies per year and votes on 165,000 resolutions (BlackRock Inc., 2025).This “fiduciary engagement” amounts to structural policy influence without direct control—common ownership that mutes competition among carriers sharing the same investors.

Hub Group: The Dual-Model Conglomerate

Hub Group’s 2024 Form 10-K illustrates how one company can be both carrier and broker.With $ 3.95 billion in revenue and subsidiaries like Mode Transportation and Hub Group Trucking, it earns margins on freight it physically moves and freight it merely books.The EASO acquisition in Mexico (2024) extends control across borders and shields internal pricing from U.S. transparency requirements.Hub Group embodies the hybrid era of logistics where corporate entities play both sides of the rate equation.

TFI International: The Northern Extension of the Umbrella

TFI International Inc. (2023 Form 40-F) reported $ 8.8 billion USD revenue and $ 800 million net income, with subsidiaries like TForce Freight and CFI dominating U.S. lanes.Dual listing on the TSX and NYSE lets Canadian capital flow through U.S. markets while retaining cross-border tax advantages.TFI’s governance and auditing (KPMG LLP) mirror U.S. standards, but its structure lets profits move through Canada before re-entering U.S. funds like BlackRock and Vanguard.It is the financial bridge that makes North American logistics a single market in practice if not in law.

Closing: From the Ground Up

They crushed the farmer, they crushed the feeder, and now they’re coming for the carrier.The evidence is in the filings, the structure is in plain sight, and the law is clear.The difference will be courage.The Federation of Professional Truckers calls for an end to the umbrella system before the industry becomes one more captured market — a ghost of free enterprise under corporate control.

References

BlackRock Inc. (2025). Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended Dec 31 2024. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

C.H. Robinson Worldwide Inc. (2025). Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended Dec 31 2024. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Hub Group Inc. (2025). Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended Dec 31 2024. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

TFI International Inc. (2024). Form 40-F for the Fiscal Year Ended Dec 31 2023. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Farm Action. (2025). Corporate Concentration in Agriculture. https://farmaction.us Federation of Professional Truckers (FOPT). (2025). Apples-to-Apples Carrier Revenue and Mileage Analysis, 2024 Dataset. 

Internal Policy Research Report. Greene, J. (2019). Beef Monopolies and Antitrust Enforcement. Congressional Research Service.

Hendrickson, M., & Howard, P. (2018). The Food System: Concentration and Its Impacts. University of Missouri. Musharbash, Y. (2024). Meatpacking Powerhouses and Market Distortion. Reuters. PYMTS. (2024). The ABCDs of Grain Control. https://www.pymnts.com U.S. Department of Justice. (2007). Antitrust Review of JBS Acquisition of National Beef.