Jason’s Law: Fourteen Years, Three National Studies, Millions Spent — and Fewer Places for Drivers to Rest

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How the U.S. Studied Truck Parking While Closing Rest Areas — and What FOPT Proposes Instead

In 2009, truck driver Jason Rivenburg was murdered after being forced to park in an unsafe location because no legal, safe rest area was available. His death exposed a fundamental contradiction in federal trucking policy: drivers are strictly regulated for fatigue, yet the infrastructure required to comply safely has never been guaranteed.

In response, Congress enacted what became known as Jason’s Law in 2012. More than a decade later, the results are measurable — and damning.

The law produced studies. The system lost rest areas.

This article documents the full record: the history, the studies, the spending, the delays, the closures, and the missed opportunity — and presents the Federation of Professional Truckers’ (FOPT) legislative agenda to correct the failure.

1. What Jason’s Law Was — and Was Not

Jason’s Law was enacted as part of the MAP-21 transportation bill in 2012. Its directive was narrow:

Require the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to assess and periodically reassess truck parking availability.
Collect data from states and drivers.
Report findings to Congress.

Jason’s Law did not:

require construction of rest areas,
prohibit closures,
mandate replacement of lost capacity,
tie Hours-of-Service enforcement to parking availability,
or impose accountability for inaction.

It authorized study, not solutions.

2. Exact Count of Jason’s Law Studies

Since enactment, the federal government has conducted three national Jason’s Law surveys:

2012–2015 Jason’s Law Survey and Comparative Assessment
2019 Jason’s Law Truck Parking Survey
2024–2026 Jason’s Law Survey (ongoing)

Total: three national studies, all reaching the same conclusion:Truck parking is insufficient nationwide.

Each study confirmed what drivers already knew — without triggering mandatory action.

3. How Much Money Was Spent — and Who Received It

Jason’s Law did not include a construction budget. Funding instead flowed through administrative and research channels:

Where the Money Went

FHWA administration and reporting
State DOT data collection
Transportation consulting firms
Engineering and planning contractors
Academic research partners
GIS inventories and stakeholder engagement

There is no single published federal total, but a conservative review of federal and state participation across three survey cycles shows:

Estimated Jason’s Law research and administrative spending: $25–$40 million

This money did not:

preserve existing rest areas,
prevent closures,
or require a single parking space to be built.

It paid to document a problem while infrastructure continued to shrink.

4. Why Nothing Changed

The lack of progress was not accidental. It was structural.

No mandates: States were free to close rest areas without replacement.
No enforcement link: HOS rules were enforced regardless of parking availability.
No accountability: Study results carried no obligation to act.
No preservation requirement: Existing capacity could be lost with no federal consequence.

Jason’s Law created a loop:study → report → recommend → repeat.

5. How Many Rest Areas Closed Since Jason Died

A comparison of 2009 national road atlases with 2025 atlases, combined with documented state closure records, shows:

2009: approximately 1,500–1,600 full-service interstate rest areas
2025: approximately 1,400–1,450

That is a net loss of 100–200 public rest areas nationwide, or 6–13% of the system, during the Jason’s Law era.

Notable closures include:

Virginia: 18 of 42 rest areas closed in 2009
South Dakota: 4 permanent closures
Arizona, Colorado, South Carolina: multiple permanent closures
Ohio, Missouri, California: multi-year closures for demolition and rebuilds extending into 2026

Even facilities still listed as “open” often lost:

24-hour access,
restroom service,
truck parking capacity,
or geographic coverage due to consolidation.

Drivers today have fewer usable public rest options than they did in 2009.

6. What It Actually Costs to Operate a Rest Area

States routinely justified closures by citing operating costs. Budget disclosures from multiple state DOTs show that operating a single full-service rest area typically costs:

Low end: $250,000 per year
Average: $300,000–$400,000 per year
High end: $500,000 per year

A conservative national average is $350,000 per rest area per year, covering:

utilities,
janitorial and maintenance,
basic security,
routine repairs.

South Dakota, for example, closed four rest areas in 2016 to save roughly $210,000 annually, confirming how modest these costs actually are.

7. What the Jason’s Law Money Could Have Done Instead

Using the conservative figures:

If $25 million was spent on studies:

$25,000,000 ÷ $350,000 = 71 rest areas
- 71 rest areas kept open for one year, or
- 35 rest areas for two years, or
- 17 rest areas for four years

If $40 million was spent on studies:

$40,000,000 ÷ $350,000 = 114 rest areas
- 114 rest areas kept open for one year, or
- 57 rest areas for two years, or
- 28 rest areas for four years

At the same time, the nation lost 100–200 rest areas.

The money spent studying the shortage could have preserved a substantial portion of the facilities that were closed.

This is not speculation. It is basic arithmetic.

8. What the Data Proves

Three national studies confirmed the same shortage
Tens of millions were spent on research and administration
Public rest area capacity declined
Closures were justified by costs small in federal terms
No preservation requirement existed
No replacement obligation followed
No accountability was imposed

This was not a funding problem. It was a policy choice.

9. The FOPT Legislative Agenda: From Studies to Solutions

The Federation of Professional Truckers (FOPT) was formed to address the exact failure Jason’s Law revealed: regulation without infrastructure.

FOPT’s agenda is outcome-driven.

A. Mandatory Preservation and Replacement

Prohibit permanent rest area closures without one-for-one replacement in the same corridor
Require geographic spacing standards
Condition federal highway funds on compliance

B. Parking Availability Before Enforcement

Certify parking availability before expanding HOS enforcement
Require enforcement discretion where shortages exist
Treat lack of parking as a mitigating factor in violations

C. Redirect Funds From Studies to Infrastructure

Cap repeat national surveys
Require freight and safety funds to prioritize operations, preservation, and construction
Preserve public facilities instead of relying on private truck stops

D. Transparency and Accountability

Annual public reporting of rest area openings, closures, and net capacity
Disclosure of study spending versus construction spending
Identification of states reducing capacity while receiving federal funds

E. Codify Truck Parking as Safety Infrastructure

Recognize rest areas as essential safety infrastructure
Integrate parking into national safety and funding formulas
Treat rest areas with the same priority as bridges and pavement

10. Conclusion

Jason’s Law did not fail because the problem was misunderstood. It failed because no one was required to act.

Fourteen years. Three national studies. Millions spent. Fewer places to rest.

The trucking community has already provided the data, the testimony, and the lived experience. What was missing was a framework that converts knowledge into obligation.

That is what FOPT’s legislative agenda exists to do.